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Introduction
This Symposium celebrates the enactment of a new mode
of protection for the electronic technology of the proprietary
integrated circuit. Dubbed a "sui generis" right in the congres-
sional debates to signify its separation from traditional copy-
right and patent concepts,' the Semiconductor Chip Protection
Act of 1984 marks the first new system of protection for intel-
lectual property since the passage of trademark legislation al-
most a hundred years ago.
A principal component of the new technology of computers
and like electronic devices, the integrated circuit, in its com-
mercial form as a "silicon sandwich," had become the object of
unrestricted rivalry in design and marketing among the princi-
pal domestic producers by the mid-1970's. As the demand for
semiconductor chips grew at an exponential rate in the late
1970's, some firms in the industry found themselves unable or
unwilling to bear the large costs in both money and lead time
of designing new circuitry. Copying some of a competitor's
products became a common means of completing a full line of
chip products for some domestic firms.2
With the entry of Japanese firms into the world market as
competitors in the manufacture and marketing of chips, United
States semiconductor manufacturers sought a more orderly
mode of competition. A significant impetus to the domestic
producers' perceived need for added industrial property protec-
tion was their comparative advantage over the Japanese firms
in research and development, rather than production technol-
ogy. As Japanese competitors began to draw heavily upon the
innovations of the American firms to produce more reliable
chips at lower prices in the world markets, the quest for protec-
tion of the underlying design of the semiconductor chips inten-
sified.3 The first attempt to provide protection within the
framework of the Copyright Act foundered in 1979 over dis-
1. See Samuelson, Creating a New Kind of Intellectual Property. Apply-
ing the Lessons of the Chip Law to Computer Programs, 70 MINN. L. REv. 471,
476-86 (1985).
2. See Raskind, Reverse Engineering, Unfair Competition, and Fair Use,
70 MINN. L. REv. 385, 385-86 (1985).
3. Id.
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agreements about the extension of traditional copyright doc-
trines to semiconductor chips.4
The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984 ("the
SCPA" or "the Act"), enacted as new Chapter 9 of Title 17 of
the United States Code,5 reflects the congressional goal of pro-
viding particular protection for the costly and time-consuming
process of designing the circuitry of semiconductor chips. By
according such protection, Congress sought to provide a contin-
uous economic incentive for research and improvement of chip
technology through an orderly mode of constructive rivalry.
This Introduction provides a brief overview of the SCPA and
the articles in this Symposium.
Under the SCPA, protection is extended to "a mask work
fixed in a semiconductor chip product," which is, in effect, how
the statute defines the set of sheets embodying the many indi-
vidual layer images etched into the semiconductor chip.6 The
Act avoids freezing protection in terms of the current chip
technology by extending protection to reproduction of the mask
work by any method.7 Like a mimeograph stencil in one of the
older technologies of word reproduction, a mask contains the
basis for the ultimate configuration of the circuitry on the
silicon chip. Protection attaches either when the mask work is
registered or when the mask work is first commercially ex-
ploited, whichever occurs first. Eligibility for protection of a
mask work is conditioned on nationality. If the owner is a na-
tional or domiciliary of the United States, the mask work be-
comes eligible for protection upon registration or commercial
exploitation.8 But if the owner of the mask work is a national
of a foreign nation state, protection is possible only if that
owner's country meets one of several tests: (1) it is a party to a
treaty with the United States under which the foreign jurisdic-
tion accords protection to the chips of nationals of the United
States; (2) it has enacted laws providing such reciprocity, as
confirmed by the United States; (3) it first commercially ex-
ploited the chip in the United States; or (4) it is making reason-
able progress toward such reciprocity, as found by an order of
the Secretary of Commerce of the United States, who delegates
4. See Samuelson, supra note 1, at 477-78.
5. Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-620, tit. III,
98 Stat. 3347 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-914 (Supp. II 1984)).
6. 17 U.S.C. § 902(a)(1) (Supp. II 1984).
7. Id. § 905(1).
8. Id. § 902(a)(1).
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this power to the Patent and Trademark Office.9
When protection attaches, the exclusive statutory rights
are given for a period of ten years from the date on which the
work is first registered or commercially exploited, whichever
occurs first.10 If, however, there is no application for registra-
tion as provided for in the Act the possibility of protection
under the Act terminates; after two years from the date of first
commercial exploitation without registration, all mask rights
are forfeited and the work falls into the public domain."
In order to be eligible for protection under the Act, a work
must meet the statutory standard of creativity or novelty. The
statutory standard of creativity is, first, that the protected de-
sign is original, in that it is the independent creation of an au-
thor who did not copy it from another source,'2 and second,
that the work, when considered as a whole, does not consist of
designs that are merely "staple, commonplace, or familiar in
the semiconductor industry, or variations of such designs, com-
bined in a way that, considered as a whole, is not original.'
' 3
By fashioning a requirement of originality requiring a depar-
ture from designs familiar and accepted in the industry, Con-
gress sought to prevent the conversion of material in the public
domain, or in its penumbra, to private monopoly under the
SCPA.
When eligibility for protection is established, the SCPA
gives the owner of a chip four exclusive rights.14 These rights
may either be exercised by the owner or by a person authorized
by the owner. The first right is to reproduce the mask work;
the second right is to distribute a semiconductor chip product
embodying the mask work; the third is to import such products;
the fourth is to induce or knowingly cause another person to
engage in one of the three preceding acts. The grant of these
exclusive rights is, however, subject to three major qual-
ifications.
Reverse engineering,'5 the first qualification, is a major in-
novation in the law of intellectual property. Reverse engineer-
ing under the SCPA permits a competitor to study, analyze,
and evaluate the concepts and techniques embodied in a pro-
9. IcE § 914.
10. Id. § 904.
11. See id. § 908(a).
12. See id § 902(b)(1); see Raskind, supra note 2, at 401.
13. 17 U.S.C § 902(b)(2) (Supp. II 1984).
14. Id. § 905.
15. Id. § 906(a).
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tected chip and to incorporate the results of such evaluation in
another chip for sale, without constituting an infringement.
The SCPA does not, however, condone piracy. The legislative
history of the reverse engineering provision states that the
semiconductor chip product resulting from reverse engineering
may be "substantially similar" to the first mask work so long as
it is not "substantially identical.' i6 Congress then drew a line
between infringing copying and legitimate reverse engineering
by imposing on the copying competitor the further obligation to
incorporate the work product of the reverse engineering in an
oiginal mask work.17
Reverse engineering is a distinct departure from the con-
cept of "fair use" in the Copyright Act,'8 because the SCPA de-
fines noninfringing copying in terms of the industry practice of
using the chip of a competitor as the starting point in the devel-
opment of a new one. Thus, the concept of "reverse engineer-
ing" has the narrow focus of customary industry practice,
directed solely to the development and marketing conduct of
direct competitors. The contrast with the broad, generalized
approach of the fair use provision is marked. The fair use doc-
trine provides no more guidance to noninfringing copying than
to state a variety of uses for protected works in which copying
may be permitted, subject to four nonexclusive factors which
speak both to ownership rights and to the economic conse-
quences of the copying. Moreover, reverse engineering strikes
a balance between the exclusive reproduction right of an owner
and the public interest in innovation, by imposing the condition
on the copyist that an improved, or at least original, chip prod-
uct must result. The concept of reverse engineering is thus a
significant departure from the traditional calculus of fair use
criteria because the SCPA approach expressly balances a limi-
tation on an exclusive ownership right to the extent that the
copyist has contributed to the public interest.
The SCPA provides two further limitations on the exclu-
sive rights which it grants to an owner of a mask work. The
first is essentially the exhaustion doctrine of the Copyright Act
and the patent laws, although the doctrine may be broader in
scope in the SCPA. The first authorized sale of a semiconduc-
tor chip product fully exhausts all of the owner's monopoly in
16. 130 CONG. REC. S12,917 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1984) (Explanatory Memoran-
dum-Mathias-Leahy Amendment to S. 1201).
17. Id.
18. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982).
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that chip.19 The vendee of the owner, or of its licensee, is free
to resell that chip at any price or to use or dispose of it in any
other way. The second limitation on the exclusive ownership
rights provides for immunity or limitation of liability for in-
fringement for a person who purchases and resells a chip prod-
uct innocent of any knowledge or reason to believe that it is an
infringing product.2 0 If such a person subsequently learns of
the infringing circumstances, the product may be resold with-
out further liability upon the payment of a reasonable royalty.
This provision amounts, in effect, to a compulsory license for a
limited time.
The remedies provided under the SCPA are essentially the
traditional ones, coupled with mandatory awards of actual dam-
ages for lost profits or, in the alternative, discretionary statu-
tory damages up to a maximum of $250,000.21
The first two of the following articles discuss these various
aspects of the SCPA in detail. The final four articles assess the
impact of the SCPA and analyze its lessons for the future de-
velopment of legal principles as intellectual property law is
confronted with burgeoning technology.
Mr. Richard H. Stern contributes the first authoritative
substantive interpretation of the Chip Act. Stem's article sets
out a sequential analysis of the meaning of the various provi-
sions, and what significance they have in the plaintiff and de-
fendant's respective legal cases. As a participant in the
legislative process himself, Stern draws on that experience to
provide insights at various points of his exposition. This concise
analysis of the SCPA should be helpful to counsel and to deci-
sionmakers in applying the SCPA to past and to proposed
courses of action.
Professor Leo J. Raskind's article assesses the significance
of the reverse engineering provision as a doctrine in the law of
intellectual property. Characterizing this provision as the cap-
stone of the SCPA, Raskind examines reverse engineering as a
variant of the misappropriation doctrine and as an alternative
to the fair use doctrine of the copyright law in the protection of
commercial intellectual property. Raskind then suggests an in-
terpretation of the reverse engineering provision. Raskind con-
cludes with a review of the Act against the background of
19. 17 U.S.C. § 906(b) (Supp. H 1984).
20. Id. § 907.
21. See id § 911.
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recent studies of the structure and current competitive status of
the semiconductor chip industry.
Representative Robert W. Kastenmeier and Mr. Michael J.
Remington provide a unique legislative perspective on the de-
velopment of the Act. Their article is a significant contribution
to the legislative history of the Act. They provide insight into
the various policy alternatives perceived by Congress as well as
the details of the course of the development of the various key
provisions of the Act as finally passed. They provide an indis-
pensable guide to understanding the statute in the light of the
public and private interests at stake when the SCPA was before
Congress.
Professor Pamela Samuelson examines the Chip Act in
terms of its development in Congress as a sui generis mode of
protection. She identifies the governing policies as a balance be-
tween protection of the author and protection of the public.
She then examines the present mode of copyright protection of
machine readable computer programs. Given the underlying
protectable interests and the nature of computer software and
semiconductor chips, Samuelson considers it paradoxical that
Congress included software under the copyright law, but found
it necessary to give chip products sui generis protection. She
concludes that sui generis protection should be given to both
software and chip products.
Professor John A. Kidwell provides a basis for assessing
the SCPA from the perspective of the technological content of
the material to be protected. He probes the nature of legal doc-
trines when extended to the protection of computer software.
In contrasting the software protection problem with the protec-
tion problems posed by semiconductor chips, he develops a tax-
onomy of analysis of legal principles to illuminate the
uncertainty that attends protection to this kind of commercial
intellectual property. Kidwell applies the taxonomy to
software protection law, noting in particular that the develop-
ment of legal standards for this class of property requires a con-
sistent vocabulary which adequately expresses the design and
function of these products. Kidwell's taxonomy raises several
other difficulties, and he concludes that changes in software
protection must be made with an understanding of the underly-
ing difficulties to avoid multiplying the existing confusion in
the law of software protection.
Professor Ralph S. Brown's article provides a context of
analysis for assessing the significance of the Act's contribution
[Vol. 70:263
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to the law of intellectual property. The article traces the evolu-
tion of the changes in the structure of the Copyright Act
brought about by new types of commercial intellectual prop-
erty. Brown then traces the development of protection for utili-
tarian articles as it developed historically at the boundary of
copyright and patent law. He then sets out the policy choices
facing Congress in protecting commercial intellectual property.
Congress could adopt the policy of rewarding authorship, either
directly or by assisting the market mechanism to accomplish
this objective. A correlative goal would be to favor the public
interest by protecting innovation as a means of enhancing that
process. Brown's conclusion is that protection should be ex-
tended in a manner that reflects an understanding and an ap-
plication of the traditional principles and policies of protection.
Leo J. Raskind
Richard H. Stern
The contributors and editors dedicate this Symposium to
the memory of Melville B. Nimmer. His writings, notably
his magisterial treatise on copyright, will stand as an endur-
ing monument to a humane scholar and teacher.
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